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Abstract
Using Compustat data, we document that prior to 1980, large R&D per-
forming ￿rms had higher R&D intensity (R&D/Sales) than small ￿rms in the
same industries. Over the course of the next two decades, in these same in-
dustries, small ￿rms came to rival and even surpass large ￿rms in terms of
R&D intensity. During this period, corporate R&D intensity nearly doubled
and most of the aggregate increase is due to the substantial increase in R&D
intensity among small ￿rms. Little of the change in composition is explained
by changes in the industrial distribution of R&D.
Why did small ￿rms increase their R&D after 1980 and not before? We
argue that, after 1980, small ￿rms were able to compete on better terms in
industries already dominated by large ￿rms. We show that the patterns we
observe in the data are consistent with a straightforward dynamic model of
R&D with falling barriers to entry.
But what barriers fell? We argue the shift in R&D intensity by small
￿rms was largely due to the electronics revolution. Prior to the 1980s, a
large corporate sales and clerical force was an essential factor for the rapid
and widespread distribution of new products. This technology clearly favored
large, established ￿rms. But the electronics revolution obviated the need for
these factors, making entry easier.
1Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Independence Mall,
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1. Introduction
Beginning around 1980, the personal computer made computation acces-
sible to small ￿rms and ￿rm investment in computers increased sharply. The
change in scale made possible by the microprocessor, we shall argue, reduced
barriers to entry and enabled small ￿rms to become more important contrib-
utors to U.S. research and development (R&D).
Until 1980, large economic actors ￿the federal government and large ￿rms
￿dominated research and development in the United States. Figure 1, which
shows spending on research and development by source relative to gross do-
mestic product, illustrates that most of U.S. R&D was being funded by the
federal government before the 1980s. The share of corporate-funded R&D rose
from the mid-1960s, but that was primarily because federal R&D was falling.
Indeed, between 1969-79, corporate R&D barely kept pace with GDP; since
then it has grown considerably more rapidly.
Why did this acceleration occur? The answer is the growth in R&D con-
ducted by smaller ￿rms. In 1980, ￿rms with 5,000 or fewer employees ac-
counted for only 15 percent of U.S. corporate R&D. This share has grown over
time. Over the course of the next two decades the ratio of U.S. corporate R&D
to GDP nearly doubled, but almost all of the increase was accounted for by
smaller ￿rms (Figure 2). Why did small ￿rms increase their R&D after 1980?
We argue that, to a substantial extent, it was because small ￿rms were better
able to compete in new product markets.
Using Compustat data, we document that prior to 1980, large R&D per-
forming ￿rms (measured in employees and in revenues) had higher R&D in-
tensity (as measured by R&D divided by sales or operating expenses) than
small ￿rms in the same industries. Over the course of the next two decades, in
these same industries, small ￿rms came to rival and even surpass large ￿rms
in terms of R&D intensity.
We point out that in the Compustat data, R&D remained highly concen-
trated in 49 (three digit SIC) industries.1 Indeed the concentration increased
rather than dispersed, despite the fact that the proportion of all ￿rms con-
ducting R&D has risen. In 1974, 83 percent of R&D was performed in these
industries; in 1999 they accounted for 92 percent of R&D.
Indeed, most of the R&D in these industries was performed by very large
￿rms￿ ￿rms with 25 thousand or more employees. These long-term incumbent
￿rms were protected by barriers to entry into product markets according to
Chandler (1994). These barriers were the result of large-scale investments in a
corporate structure whose core purpose was information processing: the sales
and administrative sta⁄. This sta⁄ in turn enabled the long-term incumbent
to sell new products in su¢ cient volume to justify large investments in new
product development.
1Our analysis (below) relies on even ￿ner industry de￿nitions, but the conclusion is the
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The PC revolution, by accelerating the automation of information process-
ing, made it possible for relatively small ￿rms to quickly transact large vol-
umes of new products since, for the ￿rst time, they were able to automate
business information processing.2 Its empirical counterpart was an increase in
the economic resources devoted to investments in computers and peripheral
equipment, as measured by its ratio to GDP in nominal terms.
The electronics revolution also reduced the cost of performing R&D. We
use a simple model to di⁄erentiate the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of reductions
in the cost of innovation. Our empirical work then examines the e⁄ect of
computerization on the responsiveness of own R&D to the R&D of rivals, and
on the market value of R&D. We also di⁄erentiate across industries and ￿rms
by separating out long-term incumbent ￿rms by size: we examine ￿rms that
had more than 25 thousand employees in 1965 and their industries to analyze
how the presence of these ￿rms in￿ uenced the nature of competition.
We are able to show that computerization increased spillovers between ￿rms
and their rivals, so that ￿rms did more R&D in the year following increases in
rivals￿R&D. We also show that computerization meant that increases in rivals￿
R&D generally reduced own market value. However, long-term incumbents
react particularly strongly to rivals￿R&D and are able to preserve more of the
value of their own R&D as a consequence.
1.1. Related Literature
The literature that relates rivals￿R&D to own ￿rm R&D and to vari-
ous measures of output (such as market value) dates back to the 1970s and
includes, for example, Grabowski and Baxter (1973), Bernstein and Nadiri
(1989), and Cockburn and Henderson (1994).
The empirical paper most closely related to our work is Bloom et al. (2005).
They explain movements in ￿rm R&D and market value with regressors con-
structed by aggregating rivals￿R&D two ways: using weights of technological-
relatedness of the ￿rms (measured by the technology classes of ￿rm patents)
and weights of market-relatedness (measured by the SIC codes of product
market segments) to identify technology spillovers and product market rivalry.
Their striking result is that technologically related rivals￿R&D increases mar-
ket value, while market-related rivals￿R&D reduces market value. They also
￿nd that both types of rivals￿R&D increases own R&D. Our interest is in how
R&D spillovers and outcomes change as a consequence of computerization. We
interact computerization over time with rivals￿R&D.
Another long and active strand of research has related industry structures
to research and development. Recently this work has looked to competitive
policy reforms to identify exogenous changes in product market competition;
2The development of the personal computer was only one facet of the e⁄ects of the
development of the decentralization of information processing in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Video terminals, for example, made computer timesharing more practical. Scanners
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the paper by Aghion et al. (2002) is a good example. They ￿nd that there
is an inverted U-shaped relationship between product market competition, as
measured by price-cost margins, and innovation, as measured by patenting
activities.
The third literature to which our paper relates discusses how the economy
has changed since the late 1970s. In general, these papers suggest that the
number of new products increased, entry occurred, and volatility and risk
experienced by ￿rms rose. Bils and Klenow (2001) argue that product variety
accelerated after 1980. The value of R&D fell in the late 1980s (Hall, 1993).
The stock market value of an older generation of ￿rms fell (Greenwood and
Jovanovic, 1999) and a new generation of ￿rms arose (Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2001). Idiosyncratic ￿rm risk rose beginning in 1980 as measured by stock
market valuations (Campbell et al., 2001, and Comin and Philippon, 2005),
while corporate CEOs￿tenure became shakier (Huson, et al., 2001.) All these
papers are consistent with the notion that R&D competition intensi￿ed, which
is what we explore.
1.2. Marketing Capital as a Barrier to Entry
In this paper we set forth a model in which established ￿rms initially have
an advantage in investing in new product development because of its past
investment in a customer base, which we call marketing capital. This model
is a simpli￿cation of Stein (1997). Our model varies from Stein in that we
focus on the impact of a decline in the cost of this investment; the personal
computer revolution in the late 1970s is modeled as a decrease in the price of
marketing capital
There are two ￿rms, an incumbent that currently monopolizes the market
and a potential entrant. Either or both may choose to engage in risky R&D.
Successful innovations are drastic; that is, they entirely displace the existing
product in the market. If the incumbent successfully innovates, it implements
the superior technology and earns additional pro￿ts. If the entrant successfully
innovates, before it can enter the market, it must ￿rst invest a lump-sum in
order to establish its own customer base. If both ￿rms successfully innovate,
and the entrant sinks its investment in marketing capital, the two ￿rms will
compete in prices. In equilibrium, the entrant would never choose to do so, as
it could not amortize the cost of R&D or its marketing capital. Entry, then,
is observed only where the entrant is the only successful innovator, and the
associated rents are su¢ ciently large.
The likelihood of success for the entrant depends on the research intensity
of the incumbent, which reduces the probability of successful entry. Conversely,
the research intensity of the entrant in￿ uences how much weight the incumbent
places on its current pro￿t stream when determining how much it should invest
in an innovation that will displace what it already has. We examine the
behavior of the incumbent and potential entrant as we vary the magnitude of
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in R&D and enter the market, as the cost of marketing capital falls relative
to the pro￿ts currently earned by the incumbent. Thus the model suggests
an unambiguous hypothesis about the behavior of new ￿rms as the cost of
deploying complementary assets falls.
The e⁄ect of such changes on the behavior of incumbents is more compli-
cated. We show that the incumbent will invest either more or less in R&D
than the entrant. When the cost of new marketing capital exceeds the current
rents enjoyed by the incumbent, the entrant does not engage in R&D. There
is no interaction, and the model is the standard monopoly problem.
As the cost of marketing capital is reduced, the entrant will eventually ￿nd
it worthwhile to engage in R&D. This has the e⁄ect of increasing the incum-
bent￿ s incentive to engage in R&D as the replacement motive is diminished
and greater incumbent R&D reduces the entry incentive. Still, as the cost of
marketing capital continues to fall, the entrant will perform more and more
R&D, eventually doing more R&D than the incumbent if current pro￿ts are
su¢ ciently high.
We argue that the predictions of the model are observed in the data. After
1980, smaller and newer ￿rms became more research intensive in both absolute
terms and relative to larger or older ￿rms. Incumbents also raised their re-
search intensity. Of course, a variety of other factors might explain these
changing patterns in R&D investments.
2. A Simple Model of R&D with Marketing Capital
There are two ￿rms: an incumbent (i) and a potential entrant (e).3 At
the beginning of the game, the incumbent is the only active producer and
earns a monopoly pro￿t ￿ > 0: Both ￿rms have access to a common stochastic
R&D technology. Firm j chooses a probability of success ￿
j; which costs
￿rLn(1 ￿ ￿
j); where r is the price of R&D relative to ￿nal output. Firms
chose their R&D simultaneously, taking their rival￿ s strategy as given. Nature
then determines the success or failure of the ￿rms￿R&D programs (we assume
these draws are independent). A successful innovation results in a new level
of pro￿ts ~ ￿ > ￿, gross of R&D costs. This innovation is drastic; i.e., the
new product drives the old one completely out of the market. In order to
produce, a successfully innovating entrant must then sink b > 0 to establish
its distribution network. If both ￿rms successfully invent, and the entrant
sinks b, they compete in prices, resulting in zero gross pro￿ts. Of course, that
would not be an equilibrium outcome of the game.
3In the appendix, we generalize the model to allow for more than one ￿rm to enter the
market.The Democratization of U.S. R&D after 1980 5
2.1. Equilibrium Outcomes
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It is readily apparent that the reaction function for the entrant is downward
sloping, while it is upward sloping for the incumbent. This makes it possible
for an incumbent to discourage entry, and the probability of being displaced,
as long as it has su¢ cient incentive to do R&D (see below).4 In our empirical
estimation, we expect the slope of the entrant￿ s reaction function to be smaller,
at least initially, than the one for the incumbent.
An interior equilibrium does not exist for all possible combinations of
the exogenous parameters (￿; ~ ￿;r;b). The various possibilities are depicted
in Figure 3, which collapses the parameter space into two dimensions (￿;b)
relative to ~ ￿ and reports the closed-form values of the ￿rms￿R&D.
In general, the most R&D is observed for small values of ￿ and b (the lower
left portion of the parameter space). The least amount of R&D is observed
for higher values of ￿ and b (the upper right portion of the parameter space).
For example, the entrant will never do R&D if there are insu¢ cient pro￿ts
to amortize both R&D and the cost of marketing capital, i.e., where ~ ￿ ￿b ￿
r ￿ 0 (region I and the upper portion of region II). Similarly, the incumbent
will not do any R&D if it costs more than the incremental gain in pro￿ts if
successful, i.e. where ~ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ r ￿ 0 (also region I). In addition, whenever
the incumbent￿ s existing rents are less than the cost of marketing capital for
the entrant, the incumbent will always do enough R&D to deter entry (the
lower portion of region II). Region IV characterizes the opposite possibility:
where b is su¢ ciently small, and ￿ is su¢ ciently large, entry is assured and the
incumbent chooses not to engage in R&D.5 In region III, both the incumbent
and entrant engage in R&D. This region can be divided into subregions of the
parameter space where the incumbent does more R&D than the entrant and
where the opposite is true.6
4It is easy to verify that in markets characterized by two symmetric incumbents (or
entrants) the reaction functions of both ￿rms are upward sloping.
5Note that in Figure 1, the boundary of this region is drawn assuming that 2r < ~ ￿: If
2r < ~ ￿;this point would lie on the x axis between ~ ￿ ￿ r and ~ ￿.
6In Figure 1, the boundary dividing these two subregions is illustrative. In the appendix,
we show actual boundary is de￿ned by the equality ~ ￿
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In region III of the parameter space, the equilibrium expected value of
rents earned by the incumbent and the entrant are
V
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The model is as simple as can be and yet yields a rich set of comparative
static results in terms of the R&D expenditures and ex ante market values of
the incumbent and a prospective entrant. For our purposes, the question is
how the behavior of incumbent and entrant ￿rms changes as we reduce the cost
of marketing capital (in our ￿gure, ￿x ~ ￿;￿; and r and then observe the change
in regions as we reduce b). We might start with an R&D intensive industry
dominated by an incumbent and eventually observe entry, initially by ￿rms
that are not as R&D intensive as the incumbent (a movement from region II to
III). Alternatively, we might begin with an industry that is not R&D intensive
and eventually observe entry by R&D intensive ￿rms, and if b falls enough, the
incumbent might also start doing R&D (a movement from region I to IV and
￿nally into III). In the latter case, we might observe equilibria where either
the incumbent or the entrant does more R&D than its rival.
2.2. Identifying the E⁄ects of Changes in Marketing Capital
In our empirical analysis of actual ￿rm behavior, we examine the e⁄ects
of changes in various parameters on the R&D intensity and the market value
of incumbent and non-incumbent ￿rms. We also estimate R&D reaction func-
tions of these ￿rms and examine the change in their slopes and intercepts over
time. We argue this is su¢ cient to identify the predominant e⁄ect of changes
in barriers to entry on ￿rm behavior. This identi￿cation strategy follows from
the comparative static results of the model, which are described in Table 1.7
Notice, for example, that declines in the cost of marketing capital and the
relative price of R&D are associated with similar (but not identical) changes
in the R&D and reaction functions of incumbent and entrant ￿rms, but very
di⁄erent implications in terms of changes in ￿rm value.
2.2.1. Accounting for entry by more than one ￿rm
A pure duopoly model may not be su¢ cient to characterize all the e⁄ects
of falling barriers to entry over time. In the appendix, we present results of
the model generalized to allow for the possibility of entry by more than one
￿rm. We do this by adding a second ￿xed cost (c) that entrants must sink
7We omit the derivation of these results as they follow directly from the closed forms in
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prior to engaging in R&D. For an appropriately chosen value of c, there exists
a non-empty region of the parameter space where two ￿rms will enter. This
region is de￿ned by a participation constraint whose boundary lies everywhere
below the upper boundary of Region III in Figure 1. Thus in the richer model,
the incumbent encounters a competitive fringe.
Consider two economies that di⁄er only in the magnitude of the ￿xed cost
of R&D. In the second economy, c is such that two ￿rms are just indi⁄erent
about entering. In the ￿rst economy the ￿xed cost of R&D is c + ": In the
appendix, we show that all ￿rms do less R&D in the second economy than in
the ￿rst, and yet the probability of at least one successful innovation is higher
in the second. And while the two entrants each do less R&D than the single
entrant in the ￿rst economy, the sum of their R&D is higher. The ex ante
value of the incumbent is higher in the second economy. The ex ante value of
the entrant in the ￿rst economy is larger than in the second, where it is zero.
For changes in the exogenous parameters that do not induce additional
entry, the results reported in Table 1 remain valid for the case of two active
entrants. For example, as b falls, all ￿rms will do more R&D, the value of
the incumbent falls and the value of entrant(s) rises. If instead we consider
reductions in c; the value of entrant ￿rms rises, but there is no e⁄ect on the
value of the incumbent unless an additional ￿rm enters. In that case, the value
of the entrants again falls to zero. And unless additional entry occurs, there
is no change in the R&D performed by any ￿rm. Thus we can use changes
in R&D to distinguish between declines in the cost of marketing capital and
declines in the ￿xed cost of R&D.
3. Data
We test our theory by using annual Compustat data from 1950 to 1999.
Compustat compiles its data primarily from corporate annual reports and
SEC ￿lings. The data di⁄er from NSF data along two dimensions. One is
the nature of the universe: the NSF and Compustat may observe the same
R&D at a di⁄erent ownership level; typically, we believe that the NSF may be
obtaining information from a subsidiary company whereas Compustat records
data from a parent. The other is completeness￿ Compustat is a data set of
security-issuing ￿rms, while the NSF aims at measuring the R&D universe
through a suitable random sampling frame.
We de￿ne R&D as reported R&D expense, Compustat no. 46. We identify
￿rm size by numbers of employees, Compustat no. 29. To measure R&D
intensity we use data on sales (net), Compustat no. 12, and on operating
expense, which we de￿ne as cost of goods sold (Compustat no. 41) plus selling,
general, and administrative expenses (Compustat no. 189). Operating expense
is a better measure of nominal ￿rm scale than sales for those new ￿rms that do
not have substantial sales. Typically R&D is expensed rather than capitalized
and is thus included in operating expense, in which case the ratio of R&D
to operating expense will be less than or equal to one, reducing the need toThe Democratization of U.S. R&D after 1980 8
censor observations.
Because we wish to focus on strategic interactions between ￿rms (see be-
low), we de￿ne industries narrowly. We count four-digit SIC codes as separate
industries whenever there are at least ￿ve ￿rms with 30 or more years of ￿nan-
cial data over the years 1950-99. For industries that do not meet this criterion,
we aggregate to the three-digit SIC level, excluding those ￿rms in the four-digit
industries that meet our criterion. This results in 196 separate industries. We
calculated an overall R&D intensity for these industries, dividing the sum of
R&D expenditures by the sum of sales and identify 69 with a ratio of R&D to
sales of 1 percent or higher in 1973. We call these R&D industries.8
We want to identify long-lived, large industrial corporations as our incum-
bent ￿rms. We choose ￿rms with more than 25 thousand employees in 1965
and focus on the set of incumbent ￿rms in R&D intensive industries (de￿ned
above).9 We identify 68 of these ￿rms spread across 28 R&D industries (Table
2).10 Together, these ￿rms in 1974 accounted for 55 percent of the R&D per-
formed by all private corporations reported in Compustat and for 77 percent
of the R&D in their industries in that year (Table 3). Within their indus-
tries, these ￿rms represented just 5 percent of all ￿rms, but 73 percent of the
operating expenditures.
We call these ￿rms incumbents, because not only are they large ￿rms but
most of them had been large for an extended period of time. 44 of the 68
are listed in Chandler￿ s list of the 200 largest U.S. industrial ￿rms for the year
1948; and 34 were on Chandler￿ s top 200 list for 1930. Moreover, as late as
1983, 58 of the 68 still had at least 25 thousand employees. Thus the majority
of these ￿rms were among the top industrial ￿rms in the U.S. for half a century,
and nearly all were very large for two decades. These large industrial ￿rms are
primarily makers of durable goods such as transportation equipment (including
aerospace, cars, and tires), business equipment (electrical, construction, farm,
and o¢ ce), and glass. The list also includes chemical producers, including
pharmaceuticals, and a few producers of consumer goods.
Table 3 shows two basic trends. First, the R&D-intensive industries in-
creased their share of R&D, as measured in Compustat. Second, the incum-
bent R&D industries maintained their share through 1989 but, thereafter, the
share of R&D in non-incumbent industries rose sharply. Using our de￿nition,
69 R&D intensive industries accounted for a little more than 80 percent of
total private R&D expenditures through the late 1980s and a higher share
thereafter. Similarly, until about 1990 the share of R&D spending concen-
trated in the 28 R&D-intensive industries with an incumbent ￿rm was about
8Details of our data set construction are found in a separate appendix available from the
authors.
9We have omitted GTE, a telephone company operator that had a subsidiary with R&D,
Sylvania; telephone companies were heavily regulated throughout most of this period, with
most of the R&D performed by the jointly held Bell Labs.
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70 percent; thereafter it declined.11
The share of all private R&D accounted for by incumbent ￿rms in R&D
industries has fallen over time, from 55 percent in 1974 to about 35 percent
in 1999, with most of this decline occurring during the 1990s. In 1974, the
share of R&D spent in these industries attributable to non-incumbent ￿rms
was only 23 percent; in 1999 they accounted for 45 percent. Thus while R&D
remains concentrated within a narrow set of industries, a rising share of this
R&D is being performed by younger, smaller ￿rms. And, as Figure 2 shows,
this is not simply an artifact of the loss of incumbents over time; rather it is
the increasing economic importance of R&D among smaller ￿rms.
Table 4 documents the distinct rise in R&D intensity of U.S. ￿rms over
time, particularly in those industries that were already R&D intensive in 1973.
And while the R&D intensity of incumbent ￿rms has grown, the increase has
been even higher among the non-incumbent ￿rms. In 1974, the R&D intensity
of the incumbents was 23 percent higher than for other ￿rms in the same
industries. By 1999, the R&D intensity of incumbent ￿rms was 40 percent
lower.
4. Empirical Results
We analyze how research and development expenditures and ￿rm market
value were in￿ uenced by changes in the cost of marketing capital. We proxy
this cost by its dual, the rate of investment in computer hardware, using the
U.S. aggregate business ￿xed investment in computers and peripheral equip-
ment in nominal terms as a percentage of total U.S. gross domestic product,
which we call computer share, or comp for short.12 We restrict our regressions
to the period from 1973 to 1997; the earlier date is the date from which we have
reasonably complete data on R&D, and the latter date is chosen to exclude
the worst e⁄ects of the Internet bubble in 1998 and after.
4.1. R&D Regressions
First, we examine the reaction of ￿rms￿research and development and mar-
ket value to rivals￿R&D lagged and market value lagged. All our regression
data are scaled by operating expense, de￿ned above. Rivals￿R&D lagged and










11This decline is not simply due to exit by incumbent ￿rms. We classify industries as
incumbent industries if they ever included an incumbent ￿rm.
12We are constructing industry speci￿c measures of computer investment and technolog-
ical opportunity (patenting) and will report results using these measures in a later version
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where i and k are ￿rm subscripts, j is a three or four digit industry group, and










where MV is market value, equal to shares outstanding at the end of the year
times end-of-year price.
According to our model, as the cost of marketing capital falls, R&D should
become more competitive, as entrants perceive incumbents￿markets as more
vulnerable. As such, we expect all ￿rms, and particularly our long-term
incumbents, to increase their R&D in response to R&D by their rivals.
We run simple reaction function regressions that have on the left-hand side
own R&D expenditures (scaled by own operating expenditures) and, on the
right-hand side, the comparable R&D intensity of the ￿rm￿ s rivals, i.e., that
















We perform this regression on the set of R&D-intensive industries as a
whole and four main subsets. All the regressions reported in the paper use
a one-year lag of rivals￿R&D intensity, but similar results are obtained us-
ing contemporaneous values. We then interact rivals￿R&D intensity with
computer share, measured in percentage points of GDP. This ratio has risen
over time (Figure 4). What we expect to see is that as computerization rises,
￿rms compete in R&D markets more aggressively, by increasing their R&D in
response to others in the same industry increasing their R&D.
Our regressions are ￿xed e⁄ect regressions with year dummies. We have
4,029 ￿rms in all, averaging just over eight annual observations per ￿rm. Tak-
ing all ￿rms together, we see in Table 6 that the coe¢ cient on the term
compt￿1 ￿ (R&D=OpExp)~i
t￿1 is 0.3964, a coe¢ cient that is both economically
and statistically signi￿cant. The comp variable rises from 0.2 to 1.0 over the
period 1973 to 1997, so the net e⁄ect of rivals￿R&D goes from -0.1 to 0.2; in
the earliest period ￿rms react mildly negatively to R&D in the same industry,
while over time this reaction becomes positive. Since rivals￿R&D has roughly
half the variation of own R&D, the coe¢ cient of 0.2 suggests that about one-
tenth of "within" movements in R&D can be accounted for by this reaction
by the end of the period.
One concern in this analysis is that the rise in computer share necessarily
has a more complex interpretation for the computer industries, which we de-
￿ne as including electronic computers (SIC 357), electronic components (SIC
367) and computer software (SIC 737). The development of the microproces-
sor in￿ uenced and was in￿ uenced by R&D in these industries. We thereforeThe Democratization of U.S. R&D after 1980 11
separate these industries from the non-computer industries. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, computer share has a slightly weaker impact on the computer industries
than on the others. It is worth considering that the dominant ￿rm in these
industries was IBM, which initially was the main developer and bene￿ciary of
the personal computer. For the non-computer industries, we divide the total
into two types: the industries that include long-term incumbents, which we
call incumbent industries, and industries without incumbent ￿rms. Within
the incumbent industries, we allow di⁄erent responses between the long-term
incumbents themselves and the other ￿rms in the industries.
We expect to ￿nd a somewhat di⁄erent interaction between the long-term
incumbents and their rivals than in the industries without incumbent ￿rms.
What we ￿nd is that there is a higher degree of strategic interaction in the
industries with incumbent ￿rms, and this strategic interaction arose as com-
puterization increased. For long-term incumbents, the coe¢ cient on rivals￿
R&D is 0.83, a stronger reaction than for other ￿rms in the same industries.
Since rivals￿R&D has a "within" standard deviation that is two-thirds the size
of that for own R&D, the impact of rivals￿R&D accounts for more than 60
percent own R&D by the end of the period. This substantial economic impact
is re￿ ected in the large proportion of R&D accounted for by the regression
(the "within" R2 is 0.39). While ￿rms other than the long-term incumbents
have a smaller coe¢ cient on the interaction of computer share and rivals￿R&D
(lagged), it is still larger than for ￿rms in other industries.
In non-computer, non-incumbent industries, research and development ex-
penditures are overall negatively related to rivals￿R&D lagged, and as comput-
erization increased, this relationship remained negative but became attenuated
over time.
4.1.1. Adding market value to the R&D regressions
The temporal relationships that de￿ne the basic reaction function regres-
sions do not include any forward looking variables that might capture R&D
investment opportunities. We therefore add lagged market value, both own
and rivals￿ , to the regression.
R&Dit
OpExpit




































+ ui + vt + ￿it
When we do so the coe¢ cients on the interaction of computer share and rivals￿
lagged R&D intensity tend to diminish, as do the di⁄erences in these coe¢ -
cients across the di⁄erent categories of ￿rms (Table 7). The one exception isThe Democratization of U.S. R&D after 1980 12
among ￿rms in the non-computer, non-incumbent industries, where the coef-
￿cient rises slightly. With the exception of ￿rms in the computer industries,
the coe¢ cients remain statistically signi￿cant
As expected, increases in own lagged market value, when interacted with
computer share, is positively related to R&D. The coe¢ cients are statistically
and economically signi￿cant (with the exception of other ￿rms in R&D in-
dustries with incumbent ￿rms). There is only one group of ￿rms whose R&D
intensity also appears to respond to increases in their rivals￿market value inter-
acted with computer share￿ other ￿rms in incumbent industries. Note that the
R&D intensity of incumbent ￿rms also responds to their own lagged market
value. So it appears that R&D in incumbent industries is strongly positively
in￿ uenced by market value increases for incumbent ￿rms. This might tend
to soften our earlier suggestion that incumbent ￿rms were reacting purely to
other ￿rms￿R&D. Alternatively, one might argue that when an incumbent
￿rm￿ s rivals increase their R&D, this suggests better R&D investment oppor-
tunities for the incumbent, whose market value rises in anticipation of its rising
R&D.
A curious exception to the general pattern is that for non-computer non-
incumbent industries, as computerization increased their reaction to rivals￿
market value increases was to reduce their R&D. We do not yet understand
why this strong reaction occurs.
However we interpret these market value interaction terms, it appears evi-
dent that as computerization increased, all industries experienced more strate-
gic interaction in R&D expenditures.
4.2. Market Value Regressions
According to our basic model, the increased competitiveness of R&D mar-
kets should lower the market value of R&D performing incumbents but raise
the market value of R&D performing entrants. However, the latter result
may not hold when more than one ￿rm is able to enter. In that case, there are
discontinuities in the e⁄ects of changes in marketing capital on the value of
￿rms and these discontinuities are larger for the entrants. Moreover, once ￿rms
successfully enter, they become incumbents (albeit perhaps in small markets).
And because there is more competition, the market value they gain from R&D
is likely to be lower than before marketing capital fell in price.
4.2.1. Simple market value regressions
We begin with ￿xed e⁄ects regressions with year dummies in which we have
market value (at the end of the year) on the left-hand side and R&D on the
right-hand side. To see the e⁄ect of the fall in price of marketing capital, we
interact computer share with R&D, and we also include book value of assetsThe Democratization of U.S. R&D after 1980 13













For all ￿rms, we get the results we expect (Table 9). Initially, own R&D
expenditures are valued at a high multiple, close to 5. R&D by incumbent
￿rms earns monopoly rents, on average. However, over time as the cost of
marketing capital falls, R&D falls in value. This appears to be the crash in
value of research and development discussed by Hall (1993).13 This suggests
that the value of new R&D was eroded by the rise of computerization, primarily
in the computer and electronic industries but also among ￿rms in other non-
incumbent R&D industries.
We expected to ￿nd a comparable decline in the value of R&D for long-term
incumbent ￿rms, but the coe¢ cient is positive and insigni￿cant. For many
incumbents, it appears their R&D remained a source of monopoly pro￿ts,
despite increased entry, and that their R&D e⁄orts were often successful. Thus
the crash in value of R&D does not appear to have happened to long-term
incumbents, at least taken as a group.
The coe¢ cient on book value in all cases is signi￿cantly greater than unity.
One interpretation of this coe¢ cient is that it is a measure of marginal q,
re￿ ecting the rise in market value with additional tangible investments. This
interpretation suggests market power and, in turn may re￿ ect the success of
R&D which itself confers market power.
4.2.2. Adding rival R&D to the market value regressions
In our ￿nal set of regressions, we add rival R&D, lagged one year and, in
addition, interact it with computer share (Table 10). This allows us to test
separately for the e⁄ects of increased R&D competition. In addition, we also
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The book value of ￿rm assets declines with computerization among ￿rms
in the computing industries and ￿rms in the non-incumbent R&D industries.
On net, however, book values remain above 1. The R&D crash ￿a fall in
13Hall and Kim (2000) report some evidence of a modest recovery in the market value of
R&D among U.S. ￿rms in the 1990s.The Democratization of U.S. R&D after 1980 14
the value of own R&D identi￿ed in the previous regression￿is by and large
replaced by the impact of rivals￿R&D. Compared to the coe¢ cients reported
in Table 9, the initial value of own R&D shrinks, as does the interaction with
computer share, which typically becomes insigni￿cant. The exception is in the
incumbent industries, where the value of own R&D rises with computerization
for incumbent ￿rms but falls among the other ￿rms in those industries.
Overall, we see that rivals￿R&D eroded ￿rm market value as computeriza-
tion increased. This e⁄ect is relative to an earlier period in which rivals￿R&D
had a consistently positive e⁄ect on own market value. The erosion of mar-
ket value over time comes to outweigh the initial positive e⁄ect in computer
industries and in industries without incumbent ￿rms. Thus it appears that
the crash in the value of R&D may in large part be attributable to the impact
of more competition in R&D markets. However, this impact is again not as
strong in the incumbent industries. Incumbent ￿rms in particular appear to
have retained substantial market power, although they have had to perform
more R&D in order to do so. And while the interaction of book value with
computer share is negative, it is not large enough to drive book value to unity.
5. Conclusion
We have hypothesized that the rise of computerization made market entry
into R&D-intensive industries easier. We argue that computerization reduced
the cost of marketing capital. Under our model, computerization should
increase R&D activity by both entrant and incumbent and should lower the
market value of R&D by incumbents. The evidence we have presented shows
clearly that as computerization increased R&D by all ￿rms increased.
Overall, as computerization increased, the market value of ￿rms fell, but
this appears to have been primarily due to R&D by rivals, rather than a direct
decline in the value of R&D. And surprisingly, the large long-term incumbents
￿while they had to respond vigorously to R&D by rivals ￿were able to retain
a large part of their market value, unlike smaller incumbents.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Allowing for Additional Entry
We modify the objective functions in the text to include a ￿xed cost (c) that
entrants must sink if they are to engage in R&D. There is one complication: in
the instance where both entrants successfully innovate, and the entrant does
not, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Instead, the entrants randomize
over their decision to sink b. In the symmetric case, the probability of sinking
b, denoted ￿; is determined by the expression
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[~ ￿￿b] ￿ ￿
2b = 0:
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where j and k denote the entrant ￿rms and we use a subscript to distinguish
this problem from the case with a single entrant. The associated ￿rst order























2)[~ ￿ ￿ b]
= 0:
The slope of reaction functions have the same sign as in the duopoly case.
The derivatives of the reaction functions with respect to ~ ￿;￿;r; and b take the
same sign as in the duopoly case.
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Problem 4 Proof. After making substitutions using the ￿rst order condi-





















































The result follows from the previous lemmas.
Corollary 5 The comparative static results for ￿rm market values with two
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2) ￿ c = 0:
Next we characterize this constraint in the (b;￿) space we use in Figure 1.
Let ^ b(~ ￿;￿;r;c) denote the cost of marketing capital where this participation
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@￿ > 0; the odds of the entrant￿ s success are maximized at ￿ = ~ ￿:
For this value of ￿; the expression becomes
(1 ￿ ￿)
 
1 + ￿ ￿
p
1 + ￿2(2 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)2 +
p
1 + ￿2(2 ￿ ￿)
!2
:
We maximize this expression numerically in Mathematica, subject to the
constraint 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0: The maximum value is -0.48 where ￿ = 0:62:The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980
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Figure 3: State Space Diagram - Duopoly Case
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Science Foundation, and authors’ 
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Table 1: Testable Implications of the Model
† 
  Change in Exogenous Parameter 
  ↓  Marketing 
Capital (b) 
↓  R&D 
Cost () r  
↑ Invention 
Size () π   
↑ Existing  
Rents () π  
R&D 
Incumbent  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↓  
Entrant  ↑  ∅  ↓   ↑ 
Slope of R&D Reaction Function 
Incumbent  ∅  ↑  ↑  ↓  
Entrant  ↑  ↑  ↑  ∅ 
Ex Ante Firm Value 
Incumbent  ↓   ↑  ↑  ↑ 
Entrant  ↑  ↓   ↑  ↑ 
†: For results for the case of entry by more than one firm, see section 2.2.1 and the 
Appendix. The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980 






Alcoa Inc  48,200 Honeywell Inc  54,600
American Cyanamid Co  34,100 Honeywell International Inc  36,600
American Home Products Corp  30,600 Intl Business Machines Corp  172,445
American Motors Corp  31,900 ITT Industries Inc  199,000
American Standard Cos Inc  37,200 Litton Industries Inc  65,600
Babcock & Wilcox Co  25,000 Lockheed Martin Corp  81,300
Bendix Corp  46,500 Martin Marietta Corp  30,000
Bicoastal Corp  101,830 McDonnell Douglas Corp  36,300
Boeing Co  93,400 Motorola Inc  30,000
Borg Warner Inc  35,850 Navistar International  111,980
Caterpillar Inc  50,800 NCR Corp  73,000
CBS Corp  115,100 Olin Corp  43,000
Celanese Corp  42,200 Otis Elevator Co  37,900
Chrysler Corp  166,800 Owens-Illinois Inc  49,000
Clevite Corp  29,141 Pfizer Inc  30,000
Colgate-Palmolive Co  26,200 Pharmacia Corp  56,200
Deere & Co  41,600 PPG Industries Inc  38,100
Douglas Aircraft Inc  60,300 Procter & Gamble Co  35,300
Dow Chemical  33,800 R R Realizations Ltd  49,700
Du Pont (E I) De Nemours  115,400 Raytheon Co   32,600
Eastman Kodak Co  55,500 RCA Corp  100,000
Eaton Corp  36,000 Revlon Group Inc  31,600
EMI Ltd  28,600 Reynolds Metals Co  30,300
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co  88,400 Rockwell Intl Corp  99,900
FMC Corp  37,600 Sperry Corp  93,600
Ford Motor Co  364,500 Texas Instruments Inc  34,500
Gencorp Inc  45,000 Textron Inc  41,000
General Dynamics Corp  84,600 TRW Inc  46,900
General Electric Co  257,900 Union Carbide Corp  73,900
General Motors Corp  735,000 Uniroyal Inc  65,000
Goodrich (B F) Co  43,900 Unisys Corp  35,200
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co  103,700 United Technologies Corp  71,800
Grace (W R) & Co  53,400 Varity Corp  45,700
Grumman Corp  30,000 Viad Corp  32,400
Notes: Incumbent firms are those firms with at least 25,000 employees in 1965. R&D industries are defined as 
industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980 
Table 3: Distribution of R&D 





Industries  All Firms 
Incumbent 




1974 16.8 71.2  54.6  16.7 12.0 
1979 17.3 70.8  53.2  17.5 11.9 
1984 18.3 68.3  48.2  20.2 13.4 
1989 15.7 71.0  49.1  21.9 13.3 
1994 13.6 67.6  41.6  26.0 18.8 
1999  7.6 63.5  34.7  28.8 28.9 
Notes: Incumbent firms are those firms with at least 25,000 employees in 1965. Incumbent 
industries are those SICs with at least one incumbent firm. R&D industries are defined as 
industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. 
 
 
Table 4: R&D Intensity 





Industries  All Firms 
Incumbent 




1974 0.31  3.32  3.50  2.84  2.63 
1979 0.31  3.32  3.49  2.90  3.00 
1984 0.45  4.53  4.52  4.56  4.85 
1989 0.46  5.08  4.89  5.56  4.72 
1994 0.42  5.42  4.94  6.43  5.54 
1999 0.28  6.38  5.56  7.75  7.01 
Notes: Incumbent firms are those firms with at least 25,000 employees in 1965. Incumbent 
industries are those SICs with at least one incumbent firm. R&D industries are defined as 
industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980 
Table 5: Statistics for R&D Reaction Function Regressions (1973-97) 
All R&D Industries 
Computer 
Industries Non-computer  Industries 
  Incumbent Industries 









Mean  Within Standard Deviation 









  .0561 .0285  .0379  .0146 .0232 .0257 












  .0575 .0132  .0150  .0108 .0105 .0137 









  1.447 1.197  1.354  .478 1.078 1.212 















































  .931 .550  .663  .368 .385 .575 
firms 4,029  4,029  1,273  60  923  1,767 
observations 33,793  33,793  8,900  1,320  9,192  14,381 
R&D Expense 
(Pct., 1973) 
  100.0 %  14.8 %  57.0%  18.3 %  10.0 % 
Notes: R&D industries are defined as industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. Computer industries 
include firms in SICs 357, 367, or 737. Incumbent firms are companies with at least 25,000 employees in 
1965. Incumbent industries are those SICs with at least one incumbent firm. Comp is nominal investment 
in computers & software ÷ GDP. The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980 
Table 6: Simple Reaction Function Regressions with Fixed and Year Effects 
(R&D Industries, 1973-97) 
Dependent 
Variable:  All Firms  Computers  Non-computer Industries 
Incumbent Industries 





































































































n  33,793 8,900 10,512 1,320  9,192 14,381 
Within R
2  .0263  .0251  .1034 .3857  .0898 .0172 
Notes: 1
st row is the coefficient; 2
nd is the standard error; 3
rd is the p value. R&D industries are defined as 
industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. Computer industries include firms in SICs 357, 367, or 737. 
Incumbent firms are companies with at least 25,000 employees in 1965. Incumbent industries are those 
SICs with at least one incumbent firm. Comp is nominal investment in computers & software ÷ GDP. The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980 
Table 7: Full Reaction Function Regressions with Fixed and Year Effects 
(R&D Industries, 1973-97) 
Dependent Variable:  All Firms  Computers Non-computer  Industries 
Incumbent Industries 

























































































































































































































n  33,793 8,900 10,512 1,320  9,192 14,381 
Within R
2  .0392 .0352 .0894 .4557 .1166 .0298 
Notes: 1
st row is the coefficient; 2
nd is the standard error; 3
rd is the p value. Regression excludes 
observations with normalized market value (i.e., divided by operating expense) or the comparable measure 
for its rivals ≥ 14. R&D industries are defined as industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. Computer 
industries include firms in SICs 357, 367, or 737. Incumbent firms are companies with at least 25,000 
employees in 1965. Incumbent industries are those SICs with at least one incumbent firm. Comp is nominal 
investment in computers & software ÷ GDP. 
 The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980 
Table 8: Statistics for Market Value Regressions 

















Mean  Within Standard Deviation 









1.433 1.139 1.294  .521  1.155 1.257 









.5742 .2504 .2653  .1144  .2200  .2495 










.0578 .0290 .0384  .0147  .0226  .0254 



















































.0403 .0157 .0187  .0131  .0129  .0152 
firms 4,153  4,153  1,387  59  867  1,694 
observations 34,508  34,508  9,455  1,304  8,638  13,584 
Market Value 
(Pct., 1973) 
  100 19.2  40.4  27.8 12.6 
Notes: Excludes observations with normalized market value (i.e., divided by operating 
expense) ≥ 14, normalized book value  ≥ 4 or normalized book value § -0.1. R R&D 
industries are defined as industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. Computer industries 
include firms in SICs 357, 367, or 737. Incumbent firms are companies with at least 25,000 
employees in 1965. Incumbent industries are those SICs with at least one incumbent firm. 
Comp is nominal investment in computers & software ÷ GDP. 
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Table 9: Simple Market Value Regressions with Fixed and Year Effects 






Industries Non-computer  industries 
Incumbent Industries 









   All Firms 
Incumbent 











































































































n  35,688  9,838  10,620  1,307 9,313 2,171 
Within R
2  .2405  .3332 .2233 .4629 .2241 .2445 
Notes: 1
st row is the coefficient; 2
nd is the standard error; 3
rd is the p value. Market and book variables are 
year-end values. Regressions exclude observations with normalized market value (i.e., divided by 
operating expense) ≥ 14, normalized book value  ≥ 4 or normalized book value § -0.1. R&D industries 
are defined as industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. Computer industries include firms in SICs 357, 
367, or 737. Incumbent firms are companies with at least 25,000 employees in 1965. Incumbent industries 
are those SICs with at least one incumbent firm. Comp is nominal investment in computers & software ÷ 
GDP. The Democratization of U.S. R&D After 1980 
Table 10: Full Market Value Regressions with Fixed and Year effects 
(R&D Industries, 1973-97) 
Dependent 















   All Firms 
Incumbent 






































































































































































































n  34,508 9,455  10,416  1,307  9,109  14,637 
Within R
2  .2432 .3445  .2297  .4804 .2292 .2082 
Notes: 1
st row is the coefficient; 2
nd is the standard error; 3
rd is the p value. Market and book variables are 
year-end values. Regressions exclude observations with normalized market value (i.e., divided by operating 
expense) ≥ 14, normalized book value  ≥ 4 or normalized book value § -0.1. R&D industries are defined as 
industries where R&D/Sales ≥ 1 in 1973. Computer industries include firms in SICs 357, 367, or 737. 
Incumbent firms are companies with at least 25,000 employees in 1965. Incumbent industries are those 
SICs with at least one incumbent firm. Comp is nominal investment in computers & software ÷ GDP. 
 
 
 
 